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Does Corruption Relieve Foreign




This paper studies the eﬀects of several irritants to foreign direct invest-
ment, including taxes, capital controls, and corruption. Moreover, it inves-
tigates whether corruption provides international investors relief from the
taxes and capital controls they face in host countries.
A large number of excellent papers study the eﬀect of taxation on inter-
national direct investment (e.g., Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon [chap.
1 in this volume], and papers in Feldstein, Hines, and Hubbard 1995).
Corruption has recently attracted attention not only from academics but
also from international ﬁnancial institutions, as exempliﬁed by the IMF’s
decision to condition its loans to Kenya on the latter’s eﬀort to reduce
corruption. Using data on outward investment from the United States,
Hines (1995) found that American ﬁrms invest less in more corrupt host
countries, which he interpreted as the eﬀect of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act. Using a sample of bilateral investment from fourteen major
source countries to forty-ﬁve host countries, Wei (1997, 2000) found that
all major source countries invest less in more corrupt countries. Later,
Hines (1996) found that capital controls have a statistically signiﬁcant and
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73negative eﬀect on inward foreign investment. These papers have studied
the eﬀects of corruption and capital controls in isolation, but not in an
integrated framework.
Furthermore, a separate strand in the literature (e.g., Leﬀ 1964; Hun-
tington 1968; Lui 1985) sees virtue in corruption. In particular, in an envi-
ronment with excessive tax, severe capital control, or numerous licensing
requirements, bribery allows ﬁrms to circumvent these otherwise suﬀocat-
ing regulatory burdens. Therefore, holding the level of tax and capital con-
trols constant, more bribes may lead to more foreign (and domestic) invest-
ment. This argument may be characterized as a theory of “eﬃcient grease
payments.” On the other hand, if regulatory burdens are endogenously
chosen by the bureaucrats solely to extract rents, one may see more regula-
tory burdens in countries with more corruption (see Kaufmann and Wei
1999 for a formal model and some ﬁrm-level evidence). Therefore, whether
corruption in a host country with high tax rates and severe capital controls
is responsible for more or less foreign investment is an open question, the
answer to which depends on the degree to which taxes and capital controls
are erected and maintained for rent-seeking purposes. Earlier papers have
not investigated possible interactions between corruption and taxation,
and between corruption and capital controls. This paper tries to ﬁll that
void.
Using data over a large number of source-host pairs, this study quanti-
ﬁes the importance of a number of economic and noneconomic factors
that may aﬀect international direct investment. It compares these eﬀects
with those of corporate income taxation whenever possible. Most impor-
tantly, it examines whether bribery in countries with high tax rates and se-
vere capital controls tends to encourage inward foreign direct investment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data set.
Section 3.3 discusses the statistical analyses and interpretations. Section
3.4 concludes.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Bilateral International Direct Investment
The dependent variable is (a transformation of) bilateral stocks of for-
eign investment in 1991 from fourteen major source countries to forty-ﬁve
host countries. The list of source countries includes the seven largest (in
terms of outward direct investment) in the world: the United States, Japan,
Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Italy. The number of
the host countries in the sample is constrained by the joint availability of
data on tax rates, corruption levels, and capital controls. The data come
fromtheOECDdatabaseoninternationaldirectinvestment(OECD1991).
74 Shang-Jin Wei3.2.2 Tax
The host countries’ tax rates are 1989 values. It is worth noting that tax
rates do not change very much over the 1989–91 period. The actual mea-
sure is the smaller of two numbers (whenever both are available): the statu-
tory marginal tax rate on foreign corporations as reported by Price Water-
house (1990), or the actual average tax rate paid by the foreign subsidiaries
of U.S. ﬁrms in that country. The data on twenty-eight of the host countries
are taken from Desai and Hines (1996, app. 2). The rest are obtained using
the Price Waterhouse source with the able assistance of Mihir Desai.
3.2.3 Corruption
The empirical work in the paper utilizes two measures of corruption.
The ﬁrst is the Business International (BI) index, which is based on surveys
from 1980 to 1983, and ranks countries from one to ten according to “the
degree to which business transactions involve corruption or questionable
payments.” The data were provided by Paolo Mauro and were used in his
1995 paper on corruption and economic growth. The second source is the
index composed by Transparency International (TI), an agency dedicated
to ﬁghting corruption worldwide. The TI index (available at http://www.
transparency.de/) is an average of ten surveys by diﬀerent agencies over a
number of years. It has an advantage and a disadvantage relative to the BI
index. On the one hand, assuming measurement errors in diﬀerent surveys
are independent, the averaging process of the TI index may produce
smaller measurement errors in the end. On the other hand, diﬀerent sur-
veys cover diﬀerent sets of countries and may use diﬀerent criteria, so the
ratings on diﬀerent countries in the TI index may be less comparable. For-
tunately, the two indexes are highly correlated (with a correlation coeﬃ-
cient of 0.88). Which index to use makes no qualitative diﬀerence for sub-
sequent discussions; hence, later sections will report results with the BI
index only.
In both original sources, the indexes are deﬁned so that a high number
means low corruption. To avoid awkwardness in interpretation, I have re-
scaled them so that a large number means more corruption.
3.2.4 Capital Controls
There are two capital control measures. The ﬁrst is a survey-based mea-
sure from Business International, collected from 1980 to 1983. In the orig-
inal survey, a higher number (say, ten) meant less restriction on capital
account. I have rescaled the numbers so that a higher number means more
restrictions. This measure is supposed to be on a one-to-ten scale, al-
though, in the sample, the minimum and maximum are one and eight,
respectively. This measure is used in Hines (1996). The second measure is
Corruption and the Burden of Taxes and Capital Controls 75a dummy based on IMF’s Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restric-
tions. The two measures have a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.46. This paper
reports the results using only the BI measure.
3.2.5 Other Data
The GDP data come from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics
database. In a few cases in which GDP data are not available, GNP data
are used instead.
The bilateral distance data measure the “greater circle distance” be-
tween the economic centers in source-host pairs. The dummy variable
measure of linguistic ties takes the value of 1 if the source and host share
a common language (either English, French, Spanish, German, Arabic,
Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese, or Italian) and 0 otherwise. Both data are
taken from Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1995).
Four additional potential irritants to foreign investment are (1) restric-
tions on foreign ﬁrms’ access to domestic capital markets, (2) restrictions
on their abilities to set up joint ventures with domestic ﬁrms, (3) restric-
tions on their abilities to bid on public sector projects, and (4) restrictions
on their corporate control rights. The paper uses four binary measures
(dummies) for the four irritants; they are all survey responses of subjective
perceptions from the Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Fo-
rum 1997).
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics on some of the key variables. The
average corruption level (BI index) is 3.70 (on a one-to-ten scale); the aver-
age degree of capital control (BI index) is 3.31 (on a one-to-ten scale); and
the average tax rate in the sample is 34 percent.
3.3 Statistical Analyses
One could run an ordinary least squares (OLS) speciﬁcation of the fol-
lowing sort:
ln( )    , FDIij ij ij u =+ 

where FDIij is the stock of foreign investment from source country i to
host country j,a n dX is a vector of regressors, including the host country’s
GDP in logarithm and the distance between the source and host countries
in logarithm. Experience indicates that, in analogy to the gravity speciﬁ-
cation on trade ﬂows, the logarithmic transformation on both sides of the
equation (of the dependent variable and of most of the regressors), called
double-log linear speciﬁcation, produces the best functional ﬁt.
Many host countries receive no direct investment from some source
countries. A serious drawback of the double-log linear speciﬁcation is that








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.to think of using a Tobit speciﬁcation to replace the OLS; but the problem
there is that the simple Tobit speciﬁcation conﬂicts with the double-log
transformation, as log of zero is not deﬁned. To deal with this problem, I
employ the following speciﬁcation in this paper:
ln( )      ln( )











where A is a threshold parameter to be estimated, u is an independently
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) normal variate with mean zero and vari-
ance 2. In this speciﬁcation, if Xu exceeds a threshold value, ln(A),
source country i accumulates a positive stock of investment in host country
j; otherwise, the realized foreign investment is zero (and the desired level
could be negative).
This framework is modiﬁed in subsequent implementation to become a
quasi–ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation: There are source-country dummies, but
no host-country dummies. The source-country dummies are intended to
capture source country–speciﬁc diﬀerences in the stock of bilateral direct
investment. Such diﬀerences include the sizes and levels of development
of the source countries, and possibly diﬀerent deﬁnitions of outward direct
investment used by diﬀerent source countries (under the assumption that
the FDI amount under one deﬁnition is proportional to the amount under
another deﬁnition plus an i.i.d. random error). Host country dummies are
not included because there are no reliable measures of year-to-year varia-
tions in corruption and capital controls, which are key variables for this
paper.
3.3.1 Empirical Results: Continuous Measures
To get some idea of the quantitative importance of corruption levels and
tax rates, I have implemented a very simple speciﬁcation. The two key re-
gressors are tax rate and average corruption level (BI index). In addition,
the estimating equation includes source-country dummies, host-country
GDP in logarithm, distance between the source and host countries in loga-
rithm, and a dummy indicating whether the source and host countries
share a common language. The last two regressors are motivated by recent
emphasis on the importance of networks in trade and investment, as in the
work of Rauch (1996).
Table 3.2 presents the basic results. In column (1), which has the most
parsimonious speciﬁcation, both tax rate and corruption measure have
negative and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. A one-step increase in
corruption rating has the same negative eﬀect on FDI as an increase in
the tax rate by 4.69 percentage points (0.09/[0.01  1.92]  4.69). For
instance, an increase in corruption level from that of Singapore (with a














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)ing of 6.5) is equivalent to raising the tax rate by 25.8 percentage points
([6.5  1]  4.69  25.8). Similarly, an increase in the average corruption
level from that of Singapore to that of Mexico (with a BI corruption rat-
ing of 7.25) is equivalent to raising the tax rate by 29.3 percentage points
([7.25  1]  4.69  29.3).
We note that all three control variables have statistically signiﬁcant co-
eﬃcients and sensible signs. A host country with a larger GDP attracts
more FDI than otherwise. A host country that is closer to the source coun-
try either geographically or linguistically (or that is historically related to
the source country) also attracts more inward investment than otherwise.
A measure of severity of capital controls (by the BI index) is added in
column (2). This variable has a negative sign and is statistically diﬀerent
from zero. Because countries that impose capital controls and those that
have high taxes tend to be correlated (with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.40,
according to table 3.1), the coeﬃcient on the tax variable declines a bit
(from 1.92 to 1.62) but remains statistically signiﬁcant. Taking the
point estimates literally, a one-step increase in the severity of capital con-
trols is equivalent to raising the marginal tax rate by 13.2 percentage points
( 0.14/[0.01  1.62]). An increase in the severity of capital controls from
the Singapore level (BI index value of 1) to the Philippines level (BI index
level of 4) is equivalent to raising the marginal tax rate by 39.6 percent.
So far, we have considered the eﬀects of tax, corruption, and capital
control in isolation. Again, a popular (and previously untested) argument
is that bribes can sometimes function as “grease payments,” helping ﬁrms
by eﬀectively reducing tax burden or evading capital controls. If the grease
payment eﬀect works in reality, then the same level of tax should be a
lesser hindrance to foreign investment in countries with greater possibility
of bribing oﬃcials.
Alternatively, the grease payment argument may have no merit. Kauf-
mann and Wei (1999) argue that regulatory burdens, such as those im-
posed by taxes and capital controls, may well be endogenous, implemented
by corruption-prone oﬃcials in order to extract bribes. In other words,
bribes might reduce taxes only in a partial equilibrium story in which the
tax rate is predetermined. In a general equilibrium, however, taxes may in
fact be higher in corrupt countries so that ﬁrms there do not end up paying
less in taxes (or facing less severe capital controls).
We now check this possibility. We ﬁrst add a new term to the regression,
“Corruption  tax rate.” The eﬃcient grease theory implies that the co-
eﬃcient on this interactive term should be positive. Column (3) of table
3.2 reports the regression with the new interactive term, “Corruption 
tax rate.” As it happens, the corresponding coeﬃcient does not diﬀer from
zero statistically (though it is positive); hence, there is no statistical sup-
port for the grease payment argument; foreign investors’ sensitivity to host
tax rate does not seem to diminish as the host country gets more corrupt.
The eﬃcient grease argument is equally applicable to capital controls,
Corruption and the Burden of Taxes and Capital Controls 81so that one may ask: Does greater corruption in a host country make the
same degree of capital controls more tolerable to foreign investors? To in-
vestigate this question, we augment the speciﬁcation in column (2) with
ad i ﬀerent interactive term, “Corruption  capital control.” The result is
reported as column (4) of table 3.2. The coeﬃcient turns out to be positive
and statistically signiﬁcant. This means literally that the sensitivity of FDI
to the severity of capital controls is indeed less for more corrupt host coun-
tries. This seems to support the grease payment hypothesis as applied to
capital controls.
On the other hand, this result does not imply that foreign investors
would necessarily invest more in a more corrupt host country. Consider
two host countries with identical capital controls (say, capital control in-
dexes  4, approximately the mean in the sample, of which the Philippines
and Ecuador would be examples). If country A is more corrupt than coun-
try B (say, the corruption indexes are 9 and 7, respectively), the net eﬀect
of this increment in corruption on FDI is still negative, because (9  7) 
(0.12)  (9  7)  4  0.021  0.072.
3.3.2 Empirics: Binary Measures of Corruption and Capital Controls
In the previous subsection, we measure capital controls and corruption
on a one-to-ten scale. Because these measures come from surveys of re-
spondents’ impressions, small measurement errors can easily change the
ranking of host countries. In this subsection, we eliminate the overly ﬁne
gradation of the capital control and corruption measures by constructing
corresponding binary measures. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne D(corruption) as a
dummy that takes the value of 1 if the corruption index exceeds 6, and the
value of 0 otherwise. Similarly, we deﬁne D(cap-control) to be a dummy
for countries whose capital control index exceeds 6.1
Table 3.3 replicates all the regressions in table 3.2, after replacing the
ten-step measures of corruption and capital controls by their binary coun-
terparts. In columns (1) and (2), tax, corruption, and capital control indi-
viduallystillhaveanegativeandstatisticallysigniﬁcanteﬀectoninwardfor-
eign investment. Other things being equal, foreign investors invest less in
a country with higher tax, more corruption, or more severe capital controls.
The last three columns show the interactions between corruption and
tax rates, and between corruption and capital controls. In column (3),
where only the former interaction is shown, the coeﬃcient on the regressor
“D(corruption)  tax rate” is negative. As in the regressions reported in
table 3.2, this ﬁnding is contrary to the hypothesis that grease payments
make taxes less irritating to investors. In column (4), where the interaction
term “D(corruption)  D(cap-control)” is added alone, the coeﬃcient on
1. Other threshold values (5 and 7) were tried and did not make a qualitative diﬀerence







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.the term is positive but not statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 10 per-
cent level. In fact, even if one takes the point estimate as given, the esti-
mates suggest that investors will unambiguously invest less in a more cor-
rupt country whether that country has tight or loose capital controls. This
diﬀers from the earlier observation in table 3.2, that bribes may reduce the
negative eﬀect of capital controls on foreign investment. In other words,
the earlier observation is not robust. In column (5), both interactive terms
are put together in the regression. The result is essentially the same as
before; there is no statistically signiﬁcant support for the grease payment
argument on either the eﬀect of tax or on that of capital controls.
3.3.3 Additional Controls
To check for robustness with regard to our inference on the validity of
the grease payment argument, I add some further control variables. The
results are reported in table 3.4.
The ﬁrst column of table 3.4 adds a measure of political stability in the
host countries. Not surprisingly, more stable regimes attract more invest-
ment. Note that our conclusions on the interactions between corruption
and tax, and between corruption and capital controls, remain true; there
is no support for the grease payment argument.
The second column adds a measure of red tape or bureaucracy in the
host countries. While the new variable has a negative sign, as would be
consistent with one’s intuition, it is not diﬀerent from zero statistically.
The last column adds average hourly wage in host countries’ manufac-
turing sectors as well as a dummy for OECD host countries. Because the
wage data are available for a smaller number of countries, this change cuts
down the sample size considerably. As it turns out, the OECD dummy is
positive and signiﬁcant: All else being equal, OECD hosts attract more
FDI. The wage variable has a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient; countries
with lower labor costs also attract more FDI. Controlling for these eﬀects,
there is still no support for the validity of the grease payment hypothesis.
Subsequent regressions experiment with adding (1) foreign ﬁrms’ access
to domestic capital markets, (2) foreign ﬁrms’ ability to set up joint ven-
tures with domestic ﬁrms, (3) foreign ﬁrms’ ability to bid on public sector
projects, and (4) foreign ﬁrms’ ability to exert corporate control rights. The
four dummies are all survey responses of subjective perceptions from the
1997 Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum 1997). As it
happens, the four dummies are highly correlated. If all four are put into
the regression, none has a coeﬃcient statistically diﬀerent from zero.
Moreover, the earlier conclusions regarding the eﬀects on FDI of tax rates,
corruption levels, and capital controls, as well as their interactions, remain
the same. If we add only one of the four dummies, say, foreign ﬁrms’ access
to domestic capital markets, this variable does have a statistically signiﬁ-
cant coeﬃcient. Greater restrictions on access to domestic capital lead to
less foreign investment. (The regression results are not reported.)
84 Shang-Jin Wei3.4 Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates the eﬀects of corruption, tax rates, and capital
on the ability of host countries to attract foreign direct investment. It
reaches two main conclusions. First, in isolation, each of the three factors
has a negative eﬀect on inward investment: Countries with higher tax rates,
or more corruption, or more restrictions on capital account transactions,
attract less foreign investment, all other things being equal.
Table 3.4 More Robustness Checks (modiﬁed Tobit, binary measures of
corruption and capital controls)
Dependent Variable:
Log(stock of FDI from i to j in 1991  A)
(1) (2) (3)
Tax rate 0.77# 0.74# 1.07*
(0.40) (0.41) (0.45)
D(corruption) 0.76 0.74 1.11#
(0.70) (0.69) (0.07)
D(cap-control) 0.13* 0.12* 0.11*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
D(corruption)  tax rate 3.00## 2.89 3.63#
(2.07) (2.03) (1.96)
D(corruption)  D(cap-control) 0.056 0.053 0.044
(0.043) (0.043) (0.046)
Political stability 0.10* 0.09# 0.12*
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06)






log(GDPj) 0.41* 0.40* 0.40*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
log(distanceij) 0.25* 0.25* 0.25*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Linguistic tie 0.60* 0.56* 0.59*
(0.23) (0.28) (0.22)
Constant 1.6E4* 1.6E4* 1.6E4*
(2.5) (2.5) (2.3)
A 7.6E9* 7.7E9* 8.5E9*
(5.7E6) (6.2E6) (4.5E6)
 0.96* 0.94* 0.91*
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Source dummies? yes yes yes
N 545 545 450
Log likelihood 1,860.02 1,867.71 1,627.73
Note: See the notes to tables 3.2 and 3.3. “Red tape” equal to 11 minus the corresponding
BI index, so that larger numbers mean more red tape.
Corruption and the Burden of Taxes and Capital Controls 85Second, the three factors could interact with each other and produce
a complicated aggregate eﬀect. In particular, it is sometimes argued that
corruption may allow ﬁrms to evade excessive taxation and severe capital
account restrictions (the grease payment argument) and thereby actually
encourage investment. In the data, there is no support for the view that
taxation has a smaller negative eﬀect on foreign investment in a more cor-
rupt host country. With regard to capital controls, there is some support
for the view that corruption may reduce the burden of severe capital con-
trols when a ten-step measure of the control is used. However, this result
is not robust to the use of dummy variables to separate high corruption
from low corruption, and severe capital controls from mild capital con-
trols. Hence, the data do not support the eﬃcient grease payments argu-
ment.
In short, the evidence indicates that taxes and capital controls hinder
foreign investment. Bureaucratic corruption adds rather than relieves the
burdens that they impose.
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Comment Bernard Yeung
The objective of this paper is to determine whether taxes, capital controls,
and corruption discourage inward foreign direct investment. More impor-
tantly, the paper attempts to check whether corruption will serve as a
“grease payment” that mitigates the negative eﬀect of tax and capital con-
trols in attracting foreign direct investment. The main results are that
taxes, capital controls, and corruption all discourage inward foreign direct
investment and that the grease payment eﬀe c ti sa b s e n t .
In my opinion, the empirical attempt is timely and important. Econom-
ics is an applied science; we need solid empirical results to back up our
theories and thus to strengthen our understanding of the world. The re-
search design in the paper is rather clever—it will allow the data to speak
up if corruption has a grease payment eﬀect. Praise to the author.
The empirical results in the paper are appealing. As an economist
trained in North America, I am biased against corruption and genuinely
would hope that the results are as credible as they can be. Therefore, I
would like to point out some needed data improvements to make the re-
sults more credible.
The dependent variable is 1991 inward foreign direct investment from
fourteen countries (including the largest industrialized countries, in terms
of outward direct investment) to forty-ﬁve countries and is obtained from
an OECD database. Diﬀerent countries have diﬀerent deﬁnitions for for-
eign direct investment. For example, the United States uses 10 percent
ownership for both inward and outward foreign direct investment, whereas
Japan uses 25–50 percent for inward and 10 percent for outward. Hence,
what is counted as inward foreign direct investment in one country may
not be counted as such in another. To the extent that countries with more
capital controls have a higher ownership requirement to classify inward
Bernard Yeung is the Abraham Krasnoﬀ Professor of Global Business at New York Uni-
versity’s Stern School of Business.
Corruption and the Burden of Taxes and Capital Controls 87investment as “direct,” a systematic bias may exist in the data. I have a
hunch that this bias may not be empirically important. Still, it would be
useful to check how the OECD data are compiled and whether the above
problem exists in a material manner.
The independent variables have more problems. Let me start with the
tax variable. In the paper, the tax variable is deﬁned as the lower of two
numbers: “the statutory marginal tax rate on foreign corporations as re-
ported by Price Waterhouse (1990), or the actual average tax rate paid by
the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. ﬁrms in that country.” Actual tax paid is an
endogenous variable likely aﬀected by corruption. Apparently, the author
believes that American ﬁrms are mostly honest and that they follow tax
codes strictly, so that their tax rates are representative of the actual tax
rates. Some would have doubts. One wonders why the author does not use
the Price Waterhouse reported rates only.
The capital control data are based on 1980–83 surveys. Capital controls
changed quite a bit from 1983 to 1991. In particular, many Asian countries
relaxed their capital controls and rolled out a red carpet for foreign invest-
ment. The historical survey data would not be irrelevant as long as foreign
direct investment behavior did not change much in the eighties. However,
to the extent that foreign direct investment surged in the eighties, the au-
thor should ﬁnd a set of survey data closer to 1991. Similarly, although cor-
ruption likely changes less rapidly than capital controls, it would be nice
to have more current corruption data.
The most interesting result of the paper is that a grease payment eﬀect
does not exist. The grease payment eﬀect is that companies can bribe gov-
ernment oﬃcers to reduce the damage of taxes and capital controls on
their businesses. As a consequence, taxes and capital controls have less
negative eﬀect in attracting foreign direct investment. The cross terms be-
tween “corruption” and “tax” and between “corruption” and “capital con-
trol” are supposed to capture that—that the presence of a grease payment
eﬀect will lead to positive and signiﬁcant cross terms. Note that the design
suggests that the corruption survey data should capture only “government
corruption.” The corruption survey data used capture something more
general: “the degree to which business transactions involve corruption or
questionable payments.” While the more general survey data are likely
highly correlated with “government corruption,” the more precise survey
variable is known to exist.
Overall, this paper attempts to show empirical evidence of the idea that
taxes, capital controls, and corruption discourage foreign direct investment
and that the grease payment eﬀect does not exist. The results are intuitively
believable. I doubt the suggested data improvements would change the
results. Rather, they should strengthen their credibility.
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